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Abstract: The SCOUT project is based on the use of multiple innovative and low impact technologies for the 
protection of space control ground stations and the satellite links against physical and cyber-attacks, and for 
intelligent reconfiguration of the ground station network (including the ground node of the satellite link) in 
the case that one or more nodes fail. The SCOUT sub-system devoted to physical attacks protection, 
SENSNET, is presented. It is designed as a network of sensor networks that combines DAB and DVB-T 
based passive radar, noise radar, Ku-band radar, infrared cameras, and RFID technologies. The problem of 
data link architecture is addressed and the proposed solution described. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Protection of critical buildings, plants and 
infrastructure is one of most important issues for the 
European Union (EU) community. Critical 
infrastructures consist of those physical and 
information technology facilities, networks, services 
and assets which, if disrupted or destroyed, would 
have a serious impact on the health, safety, security 
or economic well-being of citizens or prevent the 
effective functioning of governments in the Member 
States. Critical infrastructures extend across many 
sectors of the economy, including banking and 
finance, transport and distribution, energy, utilities, 
health, food supply and communications, as well as 
key government services (COM,2004). 
The Multitech SeCurity system for 
intercOnnected space control groUnd staTions, 
SCOUT, project is a solution for the Topic SEC-
2013.2.2-5: Security of ground based infrastructure 
and assets operating space systems (EU, 2013). 
The SCOUT project is based on the use of 
multiple innovative and low impact technologies for 
the protection of space control ground stations and 
the satellite links against physical and cyber-attacks, 
and for intelligent reconfiguration of the ground 
station network in the case that one or more nodes 
fail. 
The SCOUT system implements the three main 
security functionalities by three different subsystems 
controlled and governed by a centralized Main 
Control Unit (MCU), Figure 1: 
 SENSNET for physical attack detection and 
protection. 
 CYBERSENS for cyber-attack detection and 
countermeasures. 
Jarabo-Amores, M., Rosa-Zurera, M., Mata-Moya, D., Capria, A., Saverino, A., Callegari, C., Berizzi, F., Samczynski, P., Kulpa, K., Ummenhofer, M., Kuschel, H., Meta, A., Placidi, S., Lukin,
K. and D’Amore, G.
Distributed Physical Sensors Network for the Protection of Critical Infrastractures Against Physical Attacks.
DOI: 10.5220/0006017601390150
In Proceedings of the 13th International Joint Conference on e-Business and Telecommunications (ICETE 2016) - Volume 1: DCNET, pages 139-150
ISBN: 978-989-758-196-0
Copyright c© 2016 by SCITEPRESS – Science and Technology Publications, Lda. All rights reserved
139
 RECOVER for automatic restoration and 
intelligence reconfiguration of the space control 
ground station network, in the case of fault of 
one of the nodes. 
Risk assessment tools drive both, design and 
system functionality. 
This paper focusses on the SENSNET system 
and the data link architecture required for the 
operation, control and maintenance of the different 
sensor networks that belongs to it. 
 
Figure 1: SCOUT system concept. 
2 PHYSICAL-SECURITY 
SENSOR NETWORK 
2.1 Problem Formulation 
Nowadays, physical security systems can be 
classified into physical-based and remote sensing-
based solutions: 
 Physical-based systems are composed of sensors 
that detect the intruders when they physically 
come into contact with the sensor, or when they 
are in its near proximity.  
They usually require a high number of sensors 
(wire, tubes, cables, vibration sensor) distributed 
along the fence or in the surrounding perimeter 
area; volumetric surveillance is not provided; 
installation and maintenance costs are not 
negligible. 
 In remote sensing based systems, the intruder is 
detected far from the sensor, which is typically 
positioned in a remote site with respect to the 
surveillance area. 
Two main categories of remote sensing based 
systems can be distinguished: 
1. Systems operating in the optical and infrared 
bands: video motion detection sensors, CCTV 
surveillance systems and infrared detection units. 
Their main characteristics are the following: 
performances are heavily affected by overgrown 
vegetation, fog, heavy rain, snow, sand, storm, 
animals, debris, and movement of mounting 
posts that can be subjected to external 
manipulation; air intruder surveillance is not 
contemplated; limits for large area surveillance; 
low costs. 
2. Remote sensing security systems operating in the 
microwave region: microwave movement 
detectors, radar detection systems. Their main 
characteristics are: large area volumetric 
protection, including air targets if the radar has a 
high elevation beamwidth antenna; all 
weather/all day operating; detection of stationary 
and moving targets, emission of power (e.m. 
pollution, high costs for the presence of the 
transmitter, safety of humans subjected to very 
high frequency e.m. radiations, high probability 
of intercept by Electronic Support Measurement 
(ESM) system); possibility of deactivation 
through the use of jammers; microwave systems 
based on electric field flooding of the 
surveillance area are strongly affected by other 
electrical fields interferences. 
From the above analysis, we can conclude that 
remote sensing security systems based on radar 
technology are really promising and reliable 
solutions. Nevertheless, the radar has the main 
drawback that it emits power, and can be easily 
intercepted and deactivated by jammers. 
Security surveillance is usually limited to a 
building, and the ‘attack’ can be recognized only 
once it has started. For the reasons above, the 
physical security of this critical infrastructure can be 
greatly improved by a system that can: 
 extend the monitored area to the entire building 
perimeter, even beyond the fence for terrestrial 
and airborne attacks. 
 anticipate all critical situations (early warning). 
 preserve the privacy of people not involved in 
the buildings normal interactions (limit the use of 
image-based systems), since the refinery is a 
crowded place. 
 make use of multiple technologies which are 
fault tolerant with respect to light and weather 
conditions and that guarantees a suitable level of 
redundancy. 
 intelligently distinguish between people, animals 
and inanimate objects. 
 detect vehicles and obstacles which may hide 
dangerous people. 
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 limit the number of false alarms by properly 
filtering only the important information to the 
control room operator, in order to preserve the 
systems efficiency. 
 reduce the installation and maintenance costs. 
 reduce the electromagnetic pollution (the system 
must not be invasive). 
2.2 SENSNET Subsystem 
The main functional block of the physical sensor 
network SENSNET is depicted in Figure 2: 
 A distributed sensor network interacts with the 
surveillance area to acquire information about 
the presence of potential physical threats, and 
perform a first level detection. 
 The multi-sensor detection and tracking stage 
applies data fusion techniques to improve 
detection capabilities of the overall system and 
perform target tracking. 
 Detected targets data will be applied to a 
classification stage to discriminate between 
aerial targets, terrestrial targets and living things. 
 Classifier outputs will be delivered to the MCU. 
Design drivers combined those defined in section 
2.1. and the following: 
 Detection of stationary and moving targets. 
 Capability of identifying authorized people and 
vehicles. 
 Reduce the electromagnetic pollution and avoid 
the requirement of band allocation: (Royal 
Decree, 2001), (ECA Table, 2014), (Mazar, 
2014). 
 Low probability of intercept (LPI). 
 Reconfigurable, modular, high performance and 
robust solutions. 
 Low power consumption. 
 Use of data fusion techniques to improve 
detection, tracking and classification 
performances. 
2.2.1 Distributed Physical Sensor Network 
The distributed physical sensor network includes 
systems operating in the microwave and infrared 
regions, and Radio Frequency Identification, RFID, 
systems. 
Microwave systems selection was guided by the 
following goals:  
 Null or very low power emission. 
 Fault tolerant with respect to light and weather 
conditions. 
 Capable of performing volumetric protection 
(ground and aerial targets), early warning, and 
detection of stationary and moving targets.  
The proposed solution includes Passive Bistatic 
Radars (PBR); noise radars, and radar imaging 
sensors for target classification. 
Infrared cameras provide target images at high 
spatial resolution, also in dark conditions, which are 
useful for target classification. 
Microwave and infrared imaging system 
guarantee the preservation of people privacy. 
RFID mounted on friendly people and vehicles 
will be used to identify authorized people and 
vehicles. 
The above sensors are equipped with an own 
detector, whose outputs will be a first level of 
detection (pre-detections).  
 
Figure 2: Physical sensor network functional block 
diagram. 
2.2.2 Multi-sensor Detection, Tracking and 
Classification 
A multi-sensor detector based on data fusion 
techniques refines the single sensor plots and 
provides the final detections with higher 
performance in terms of probability of detection, and 
probability of false alarms, by properly filtering only 
the important information to the control room 
operator, in order to preserve the systems efficiency. 
A first level classifier provides a preliminary 
classification of unknown targets in three classes: 
aerial vehicle, terrestrial vehicle, and possible 
humans. Known people detected and tracked by the 
RFID system are discarded. 
Targets classified as possible humans will be 
illuminated by infrared and microwave imaging 
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systems to generate images that will be driven to the 
second level classifier in charge of classifying into 
three classes: humans, animals, and others. 
3 SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS 
SENSNET operative requirements are summarized 
in Table 1. The coverage area is structured in four 
sub-areas (Figure 3): 
 The aerial early alert area defines a ring centred 
on the facility central point, and extends from 
10km to 20km. The objective is the early 
detection of low altitude aerial targets 
approaching the facility.  
 Targets to be sought are big-medium commercial 
airplanes and small aircrafts (CESSNA type). 
 The higher resolution aerial surveillance area 
defines a circle centred in the central point of the 
facility with a radius of 10km. 
 Targets of interest are small aircrafts, medium 
size (>5m of wingspan) drones, and ultralight 
aircrafts with cockpit. 
 External area close to the perimeter fence, 
defined by a radius 2-3 km bigger than the 
distance of outermost point of the perimeter 
fence from the central point of the facility. 
Targets to be sough include aerial ones 
(ultralight aircrafts or small drones), medium 
distance weapons (shoulder-launched rockets) 
and ground vehicles (trucks, vans or cars). 
Persons trying to climb or run through the fence 
will be also targets of interest. 
Table 1: SENSNET operative requirements. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Coverage areas. 
4 SCENARIO DEFINITION 
The case study is defined on the Tracking & 
Imaging Radar (TIRA) system site, located on a 
campus shared by the two Fraunhofer Institutes FHR 
and FKIE (Figure 4). A 3D CAD model was built for 
the analysis of shadowed areas (Figure 5). 
 
Figure 4: TIRA site. 
 
Figure 5: 3D CAD model of the TIRA site. Colours 
represent priority level: high priority (red), medium 
priority (orange), low priority (green), parking (pink). 
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5 SENSNET ARCHITECTURE 
SENSNET architecture is depicted in Figure 6. In 
the following subsections, SENSNET technologies 
are described. 
5.1 Passive Radar Network 
A Passive Bistatic Radar (PBR) can be defined as a 
set of radar techniques that use non-cooperative 
signals, such as broadcast, communications, radar, 
or radio-navigation signals as Illuminators of  
Opportunity (IoO), rather than a dedicated 
transmitter (IEEE, 2008). These systems are very 
attractive due to their low costs, their low probability 
of interception, and low power consumption. The 
basic system geometry is shown in Figure 7. 
A dual channel reception system is required: a 
surveillance channel for targets acquisitions, and a 
reference one, for capturing the IoO signal. Target 
echoes signals will be correlated with Doppler shifted 
copies of the reference signal to generate the Cross-
Ambiguity Function, CAF, that will provide 
processing gain and the capability of estimating 
bistatic range and Doppler of the detected targets. 
Digital Audio Broadcasting (DAB) and Digital Video 
Broadcasting-Terrestrial (DVB-T) were selected as 
IoOs (Coleman, 2008), (Saini, 2005), (Conti, 2010), 
(Kulpa, 2011), (Gomez-del-Hoyo, 2015). 
Available IoOs in the considered case of study 
are shown in Figure 8 and Figure 9. 
The proposed passive radar node architecture is 
based on Software Defined Radar, SDR, principles 
(Figure 10). Antenna arrays are used due to the 
angular resolutions required by the targets to be 
sought, and the coverage requirements. 
 
Figure 6: SENSNET general architecture. 
 
Figure 7: PBR geometry. 
Sensor emplacement techniques will be applied 
together with the information of the available IoOs 
to design the final network architecture. 
Beamforming techniques will play a key role, 
allowing the generation of multiple radiation beams 
in order to fulfill the required instrumented angular 
coverage and azimuth resolutions. The first approach 
of passive radar network structure is shown in 
Figure 11. 
 
Figure 8: Available DVB-T IoOs. 
 
Figure 9: Available DAB IoOs. 
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Figure 10: Basic scheme of a PBR node. 
 
Figure 11: First approach of passive radar network 
architecture. 
5.2 Noise Radar 
Noise Radars (NR) use random noise, pseudo-
random or chaotic waveforms as sounding signals, 
and coherent processing for target detection. These 
signals provide important properties: optimal 
coherent reception and high compression rate, 
independent control of velocity and range 
resolutions, no side lobes in Ambiguity Function, no 
range ambiguity for both Continuous Wave (CW) 
and pulse radar. 
NR enables better performance in LPI, immunity 
against interferences and/or jamming, and better 
electromagnetic compatibility performance between 
different units and different types of radar sensors. 
Spectrum sharing problem may be easier solved 
using correlation properties of noise waveforms with 
wide enough power spectrum bandwidth. Two NR 
sensor networks are proposed: 
 A C-band noise radar network for the detection 
of medium distance weapons (shoulder-launched 
rockets) and ground vehicles (trucks, vans or 
cars) in the external area close to the perimeter 
fence, and for complementing passive radars for 
the detection of ultralight aircrafts or small 
drones approaching the perimeter fence in the 
higher resolution aerial surveillance area 
(Malanowski, 2012), (Shelevytsky,2013). 
 A Ka-band Ground Based Noise Waveform SAR 
(GB NW SAR) network for the detection of 
moving targets in the inside perimeter area, in 
combination with RFID sensors, and for 
complementing passive and C-band noise radars 
for the detection of the most challenging targets 
approaching the perimeter fence: ultralight 
aircrafts, small drones and persons (Lukin,2008), 
(Lukin,2005). 
Figure 12 shows a possible Ka-band GB NW 
SAR sensor network configuration for the detection 
of objects inside the TIRA-site, and others 
approaching the main gates or other parts of the 
perimeter, being a complement of passive radar and 
C-band noise radar networks for the detection of 
ultralight aircrafts, small drones and persons 
approaching the perimeter fence.  
 
Figure 12: TIRA site coverage with GB NW SAR sensor 
network with four antennas. 
5.3 Imaging Sensors 
Two types of sensors are responsible of target 
images generation for classification purposes: 
 A Ku-band system which operates in real 
aperture mode, and can provide high resolution 
radar data which can be used with Inverse SAR 
algorithms for the generation of the target’s 
images (Metasensing. 2015), (Marotti, 2015). 
 A network of Pan-Tilt-Zoom (PTZ) cameras, 
which are characterized by an angular Field of 
View, FoV, that can vary along the three 
dimensions: horizontal (pan), vertical (tilt), and 
depth (zoom). Midwave and Longwave cameras 
are used, because they do not require an 
illumination source. 
5.4 RFID Sensor Network 
The goal of the RFID sensors network is to monitor 
and track critical people and/or objects in the area 
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inside the perimeter fence, to avoid that people can 
access an unauthorized area without proper 
permission (Vitrociset2012).  
The data acquired though the sensors will be 
managed through a centralized server, connected to 
the overall SCOUT infrastructure via a proper link 
(Figure 13). 
 
Figure 13: RFID Centralized Data Management. 
The system is designed following a hybrid 
approach, based on the consideration that the 
localization will be divided in two main parts and 
that different RFID active transponders can be used: 
 Outdoor (Figure 14)– the target’s localization is 
made with estimation techniques (Received 
Signal Strength, Time Of Arrival, Time 
Difference Of Arrival, Received Signal Phase, 
Angle Of Arrival); 
 Indoor (Figure 15) – the target’s localization is 
made with proximity techniques based on a 
dense deployment of antenna. 
The proposed architecture can be completely 
customized considering the user’s needs and the 
Ground Station structure. 
6 DATA LINK ARCHITECTURE 
A basic communication point-to-multipoint topology 
is defined in Figure  16, assuming the SENSNET 
general architecture (Figure 6). Each subsystem is 
composed by a set of sensors distributed throughout 
the facility area that are connected to the MCU. In 
Figure 16, each sensor network is represented by a 
cloud, although, in each network, each node is 
connected to the MCU. 
 
Figure 14: RFID outdoor localization level. 
 
Figure 15: RFID indoor localization level: level 1 (left) 
and level 2 (right). 
 
Figure 16: SENSNET communication network basic 
diagram. 
6.1 Messages Types 
According to the information required or provided 
by the different nodes, the following types of 
messages are defined: 
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 MCU_Configuration messages: The MCU must 
be able to modify sensor subsystem operative 
parameters in order to adapt the SENSNET 
performance to a changing environment, or to 
carry out system updates.  
 MCU_Management messages: For fulfilling the 
second level classifier input constrains, S-MCU 
must be able to ask the IR, the Ku-band 
 radar, and the radiometric SAR sub-systems for 
additional information about specific targets. 
 SENSOR_Data Fusion messages: Detection and 
tracking messages will be generated in each of 
the nodes belonging to sensor networks 
responsible of surveillance tasks for target 
detection and tracking: PBR, NOISE RADAR, 
Ku-band radar, and RFID. These data will be fed 
to the data-fusion and/other first classifier stages, 
following the architecture presented in Figure 6. 
A common data format must be defined for this 
type of messages in order to facilitate the data 
fusion process. 
 SENSOR_2LClass messages: As answers to the 
MCU requests, IR and Ku-band radar 
subsystems must provide additional information 
related to detections classified as possible 
humans. 
In order to reduce the required communication 
network bandwidth, the direct transmission of the 
signals acquired by each node must be avoided. The 
use of array antennas and digital beamforming 
techniques, impose the use of a dedicated data link 
for each single radiating element of each antenna 
array, giving rise to an unaffordable transmission 
bandwidth if raw data is transmitted to the S-MCU 
or to central nodes designed for the processing of 
raw data acquired by the nodes of a specific sub-
system (sensor network). Local processing also 
enhances the robustness of the SENSNET, because 
if one node is attacked, the rest of the nodes will 
continue working, and could be reconfigured for 
guaranteeing the physical protection of the 
infrastructure. So SENSNET will be a distributed 
sensor network. 
Nodes belonging to sensor networks responsible 
for target detection and tracking will perform 
detection and tracking tasks and will generate local 
SENSOR_DATA_Fusion messages that will be sent 
to the S-MCU, more specifically, to the multisensor 
detector and tracker. This architecture also improves 
real time processing capabilities. As an answer to 
MCU_Management messages, the nodes belonging 
to sensor networks responsible of providing 
additional information to the second level classifier, 
will generate local SENSOR_2LClass messages. 
6.2 Sensors Data Format  
The multisensor detector and tracker module uses 
the detection and tracking data generated by each 
sensor that belongs to GB-SAR, PBR, and NOISE 
radar sensor networks. As additional information, 
data provided by the RFID network, mainly 
consisting of identification and locations tags, are 
also analysed in this data fusion stage in order to 
improve system surveillance capabilities. 
To facilitate the fusion task, a common data 
format shall be defined for monostatic sensors, as 
well as for bi/multi-static ones in the Cartesian 
domain.  
In Table 2-Table 6, data fields of the 
SENSOR_Data_Fusion messages are defined: 
 TypeID defines the type of message. 
 sourceID identifies the sensor network to which 
the node belongs to (the type of node). 
 rxUid identifies each single node. 
 trackID. Each SENSNET node is capable of 
performing radar observations in either the 
Range/Doppler or Cartesian plane. By 
associating consecutive observations the node 
assigns unique track ID's to target detections. 
 timeStamp. All nodes are required to give a time 
stamp in epoch time, associated to each track ID, 
making necessary a clock signal distribution 
among the all SENSET nodes. 
To accommodate outputs from many different 
types of systems, a selection of possible fields is 
proposed. The column titled Optional indicates 
fields that might not be strictly needed for the fusion 
task, or that are redundant if other measurement 
fields can be provided, indicating for which sub-
systems that field is required. 
IR and Ku-band radar nodes must perform local 
classification tasks to distinguish between persons, 
animals and others. SENSOR_2LClass messages 
will contain the fields defined in Table  2, and 
specific fields related to image quality and 
classification accuracy (Table 3) and target features. 
The final data fields will be defined when the signal 
processing solutions for classification will be 
designed. Specific fields could be defined for IR 
nodes, because the transmission payload associated 
to IR images is clearly lower than radar ones. 
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Table 2: Data exchange format for SENSNET subsystems: 
target identification fields. 
Detection Identification fields 
# Field 
name 
Unit Description Optional 
0 TypeID # MCU_Configuration 
(1), 
MCU_Management 
(2), 
SENSOR_Data 
Fusion (3), 
SENSOR_2LClass 
(4), … 
No 
1 
 
sourceID # Passive Radar(1), 
Noise Radar(2), GB-
SAR(3), RFID(4) 
No 
2 trackID # Unique 
Identification of the 
track 
No 
3 txUid # Unique 
Identification of 
illuminating 
transmitter (for 
PBR) 
Not for 
PBR 
4 rxUid # Unique 
Identification of the 
receiver 
No 
5 timeStamp 
 
sec Unix epoch time 
since 1.1.1970 of the 
track head 
No 
Table 3: Data exchange format for SENSNET subsystems: 
quality estimation fields. 
Quality estimation fields 
# Field 
name 
Unit Description Optional 
6 power 
 
dBW Without system 
correction 
Yes 
7 snr_dB 
 
dB Signal to Noise 
ratio of the 
latest update 
Yes 
8 probability 
 
Value 
from 
0.0 to 
1.0 
Probability of 
this target 
track. 
No (Yes 
for RFID) 
Table 4: Data exchange format for SENSNET subsystems: 
estimated target location fields. 
Targets location fields 
# Field 
name 
Unit Description Optional 
9 range m Monotstatic range to 
receiver (rxUid) 
For 
PBR 
10 detour 
 
m Bistatic range with 
respect to rxUid and 
txUid (for PBR) 
Not for 
PBR 
11 Doppler Hz Bistatic Doppler 
with respect to rxUid 
and txUid (for PBR) 
Not for 
PBR 
12 azimuth deg Target azimuth No 
angle receiver with 
respect to 0° as true 
north (rxUid) 
13 elevation deg Target elevation 
angle receiver with 
respect to (rxUid). 
Horizont at 0°. 
Yes 
14 latitude deg Target WGS84 
latitude with respect 
Yes 
15 longitude deg Target WGS84 
longitude with 
respect 
Yes 
16 altitude m Target altitude 
above sea level 
Yes 
Table 5: Data exchange format for SENSNET subsystems: 
estimated target dynamic fields. 
Targets dynamic fields 
# Field name Unit Descriptio
n 
Optiona
l 
17 detourRate 
 
m/s Bistatic 
range rate  
with 
respect to 
rxUid and 
txUid (for 
PBR) 
Not for 
PBR 
18 detourAccelerat
ion 
 
m/s/s Bistatic 
range 
accelerati
on with 
respect to 
rxUid and 
txUid (for 
PBR) 
Yes 
19 veloVertical m/s Target 
climb rate 
Yes 
20 veloAzimuth 
 
deg/s Change in 
azimuth 
angle 
receiver 
with 
respect to 
(rxUid) 
Yes 
21 veloElevation 
 
deg/s Change in 
elevation 
angle 
receiver 
with 
respect to 
(rxUid) 
Yes 
22 veloAcc m/s Accuracy 
of the 
velocity 
measurem
ent 
Yes 
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Table 6: Data exchange format for SENSNET subsystems: 
tracking and plot fields. 
Tracking fields 
# Field name Unit Descriptio
n 
Optio
nal 
23 xyz_1_ 
xyz_2_ 
xyz_3_ 
m 
m 
m 
Measurem
ent vector. 
Easting, 
Northing 
and 
Altitude 
of 
position, 
referred to 
the 
receiver 
location. 
If 
lat/lo
n is 
given 
24 xyzRate_1_ 
xyzRate_2_ 
xyzRate_3_ 
m/s 
m/s 
m/s 
Measurem
ent vector. 
Easting, 
Northing 
and 
Altitude 
of 
velocity, 
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6.3 Physical Network  
Given the criticality of the considered scenario, the 
most reasonable choice, as far as the transmission 
medium is concerned, is represented by wired 
connections. Indeed, the use of wireless links would 
expose SENSNET to attacks, such as jamming, 
posing serious concerns on the robustness of the 
system. 
Hence, the idea is to rely on Gigabit Ethernet, 
also considering that such a technology is most 
probably already deployed in the infrastructure to be 
protected. It is important to highlight that such a 
LAN technology, if correctly configured and 
dimensioned, should be able to guarantee the 
requested constraints in terms of throughput and 
delay. 
6.4 Application Layer Protocol  
Regarding the application layer protocol, the idea is 
to make use of a publish/subscribe framework, able 
to automatically deal with the real-time nature of the 
produced data. 
In this way, there is no need of implementing 
“standard” sockets (creating server and clients) for 
exchanging the collected data, since the 
communication framework directly manages all the 
exchanges. 
In more detail, the idea is to use the Data 
Distribution Service for Real-Time Systems (DDS), 
which is an object management group (OMG) 
machine-to-machine (m2m) middleware standard 
that aims to enable scalable, real-time, interoperable 
data exchange between publishers and subscribers. 
DDS is networking middleware that simplifies 
complex network programming. It implements 
a publish/subscribe model for sending and receiving 
data, events, and commands among the nodes. 
Nodes that produce information (publishers), in our 
case the sensors, create "topics" (e.g., location) and 
publish "samples". DDS delivers the samples to 
subscribers, in our case the S-MCU, which declare 
an interest in that topic. 
Moreover, DDS allows the user to specify a wide 
range of parameters for Quality of Service (QoS) 
support, which make it strongly suitable for real-
time communications. Such parameters can be split 
into four main categories: 
 Data availability: decouple applications in time 
and space. They also enable these applications to 
cooperate in highly dynamic environments 
characterized by continuous joining and leaving 
of publishers and subscribers. 
 Data delivery: control the reliability and 
availability of data, thereby allowing the delivery 
of the right data to the right place at the right 
time. 
 Data timeliness: provide control over the 
temporal properties of data. 
 Resources: provide control over the local and 
end-to-end resources, such as memory and 
network bandwidth. 
6.5 Network Synchronization 
The basic proposed clock distribution scheme is 
presented in Figure 17. Taking advantage of very 
low RTT, typical of Gigabit Ethernet based LAN, 
the trusted and well known Network Time Protocol, 
NTP, can be used.  
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A NTP server could be locally installed in the 
MCU in order to exploit the infrastructure and the 
network access deployed for data transmission. Most 
NTP servers can capture GPS satellite clocks in 
order to provide a reliable synchronization time 
signal. Then, using the SENSNET network and the 
NTP protocol, the time information can be reliably 
distributed to all nodes.  
 
Figure 17: SENSNET synchronization time distribution 
scheme. 
7 CONCLUSIONS 
The SCOUT system implements the three main 
security functionalities: 
1) Physical attack detection and protection. 
2) Cyber-attack detection and countermeasures. 
3) Automatic restoration and intelligence 
reconfiguration of the space control ground 
station network, in the case of fault of one of the 
nodes. 
Sensor networks are used for acquiring 
information about potential attacks and/or possible 
damages of attacks once inflicted. Taking into 
consideration the different characteristics of physical 
and cyber intrusions, specific sensor networks are 
used for monitoring the physical and cyber 
surveillance environments, respectively. 
This paper focusses on the physical surveillance 
system, describing the main characteristics of the 
global network of sensor networks exploiting 
different technologies. Main design drivers were: 
fault tolerant with respect to light and weather 
conditions; capability of identifying authorized 
people and vehicles; intelligent discrimination 
between people, animals and inanimate objects, 
preserving the privacy of people; reduce the 
electromagnetic pollution; low probability of 
intercept; avoid the requirement of band allocation; 
reconfigurable, modular, high performance and 
robust solutions, with low installation and 
maintenance costs. 
The data provided by the sensor networks will be 
processed by a Main Control Unit (MCU) to 
determine a situation awareness picture, which is 
used to assess the degree of alert. If potential threats 
are detected, the MCU can order the corresponding 
sensor network to focus on tracking it.  
Each node of each sensor network will perform 
detection or classification tasks, providing processed 
data following a defined format. This solution 
reduces transmission bandwidth requirements, and 
improves robustness against nodes physical attacks 
or failures. Considering the security of the 
communications as a valuable feature for the 
transmission medium selection, wired networks are 
in general cheaper and more reliable. Thanks to the 
low transmission bandwidth, LAN based on 
Gigabyte Ethernet using UTP cable could be 
considered.  
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